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 AGE AND TENURE OF THE JUSTICES AND 
PRODUCTIVITY OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT:  
ARE TERM LIMITS NECESSARY? 
JOSHUA C. TEITELBAUM* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article examines the relationship between the productivity of the 
U.S. Supreme Court and the age and tenure of the Supreme Court 
Justices. The motivation for this Article is the Supreme Court Re-
newal Act of 2005 (SCRA) and other recent proposals to impose term 
limits for Supreme Court Justices. The authors of the SCRA and oth-
ers suggest that term limits are necessary because, inter alia, in-
creased longevity and terms of service of the Justices have resulted in 
a decline in the productivity of the Court as measured by the number 
of cases accepted for review and the number of opinions issued per 
term. On the whole, the empirical findings of this Article do not pro-
vide clear support for this assertion. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 This Article examines the relationship between the productivity of 
the U.S. Supreme Court and the age and tenure of the Supreme 
Court Justices. The motivation for this Article is the Supreme Court 
Renewal Act of 20051 (SCRA) and other recent academic proposals to 
impose term limits for Supreme Court Justices.2 The SCRA has been 
                                                                                                                     
 * Ph.D. student, Department of Economics, Cornell University; J.D., Harvard Law 
School; B.A., Williams College. I would like to thank Paul Carrington, Rick Geddes, Mi-
chael Heise, Nick Kiefer, and Bill Rosen for helpful comments. Any errors are my own. 
 1. Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, The Supreme Court Renewal Act: A 
Return  to  Basic  Principles,  July  5, 2005,  available  at  http://paulcarrington.com/ 
Supreme%20Court%20Renewal%20Act.htm [hereinafter SCRA]. The SCRA is a legislative 
proposal coauthored by two law professors. It has not been introduced in Congress. 
 2. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme 
Court: Life Tenure Reconsidered, in REFORMING THE COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR SUPREME 
COURT JUSTICES 15 (Roger C. Cramton & Paul D. Carrington eds., 2006); James E. DiTul-
lio & John B. Schochet, Saving This Honorable Court: A Proposal to Replace Life Tenure on 
the Supreme Court with Staggered, Nonrenewable Eighteen-Year Terms, 90 VA. L. REV. 
1093 (2004); Philip D. Oliver, Systematic Justice: A Proposed Constitutional Amendment to 
Establish Fixed, Staggered Terms for Members of the United States Supreme Court, 47 
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endorsed in principle by prominent legal scholars and practicing at-
torneys hailing from all parts of the country and the political spec-
trum,3 was the subject of a symposium held at Duke Law School in 
April 2005,4 and has received considerable attention in both the 
mainstream5 and legal press6 and on academic weblogs.7 
 Under the SCRA, Justices would be subject to staggered, nonre-
newable eighteen-year terms.8 The President would appoint a new 
Justice during the first session of Congress after each federal elec-
tion, without waiting for a vacancy on the Court.9 Sitting Justices 
                                                                                                                     
OHIO ST. L.J. 799 (1986). Like the SCRA, the foregoing are academic proposals and have 
not been introduced in Congress. 
 3. See SCRA, supra note 1; see also Linda Greenhouse, How Long is Too Long for the 
Court’s Justices?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2005, § 4, at 5; Linda Meyers, Law Professor Pro-
poses Term Limits for Supreme Court Justices, CORNELL CHRON., Jan. 27, 2005, at 4; Stu-
art Taylor Jr., For Life?: Points of View: Term Limits for Supreme Court Justices Would 
Reduce a Host of Ills, LEGAL TIMES, June 27, 2005, at 44. 
 4. REFORMING THE COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT JUSTICES (Roger 
C. Cramton & Paul D. Carrington eds., 2006) [hereinafter REFORMING THE COURT]. 
A  webcast   of   the   symposium  is   available   at   http://uc.princeton.edu/main/ 
index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=81&Itemid=18. 
 5. See, e.g., Ronald Brownstein, Time to Bring Down the Gavel on Lifetime Tenure for 
Justices?, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2005, § A, at 10; Paul Campos, Time Ripe for High Court 
Fix, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, July 19, 2005, at 31A; Greenhouse, supra note 3; Tony Mauro, 
Roots Grow Deeper on the Supreme Court, USA TODAY, Jan. 13, 2005, at 11A; Our Turn: 
The Case for Limiting Tenure on High Court, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, July 31, 2005, 
at 2H; Dru Sefton & Chuck McCutcheon, Life Terms Debated for Supreme Court: Older 
Justices Can Lose Skills, Law Experts Say, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), July 24, 2005, 
at 12; Weekend Edition: Stuart Taylor on Term Limits for High Court Justices (National 
Public Radio broadcast Oct. 22, 2005) [hereinafter NPR], transcript available at 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4969895. 
 6. See, e.g., Jerry Crimmins, Professors Propose Term Limits for Justices, CHI. DAILY 
L. BULL., Jan. 28, 2005, at 3; Tony Mauro, Lifetime Tenure Under Attack: Law Profs: U.S. 
Supreme Court Justices ‘Hanging on Too Long,’ CONN. L. TRIB., Jan. 10, 2005, at 1; Leo-
nard Post, A Mixed Reaction to Term Limits for Justices, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 28, 2005, at P4; 
Taylor, supra note 3. 
 7. For example, there have been multiple postings on The Becker-Posner Blog 
(http://www.becker-posner-blog.com) and on The Volokh Conspiracy (http://volokh.com).  
See, e.g., Posting of Randy Barnett to The Volokh Conspiracy, 
http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2005_02_13-2005_02_19.shtml#1108763212 (Feb. 18, 
2005, 16:46 EST); Posting of Gary S. Becker to The Becker-Posner Blog, 
http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/archives/2005/03/yes_to_term_lim.html (Mar. 12, 2005, 
12:55 EST); Posting of Jim Lindgren to The Volokh Conspiracy, 
http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2005_02_20-2005_02_26.shtml#1108961987 (Feb. 20, 
2005,  22:59 EST); Posting of Richard A. Posner to The Becker-Posner Blog, 
http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/archives/2005/03/judicial_term_l.html (Mar. 12, 2005, 
14:09 EST). 
 8. See SCRA, supra note 1, §§ B-D. The other proposals cited supra note 2 also con-
template staggered, nonrenewable eighteen-year terms. See Calabresi & Lindgren, supra 
note 2, at 17; DiTullio & Schochet, supra note 2, at 1096-97; Oliver, supra note 2, at 800. 
 9. See SCRA, supra note 1, §§ B-D. Under the other proposals cited supra note 2, the 
terms of the Justices also would be structured so that the President would make two ap-
pointments during each of his or her four-year terms. However, the other proposals differ 
from the SCRA in their treatment of midterm vacancies. Under the SCRA, if a midterm 
vacancy occurs, a new Justice would be “appointed and considered as the Justice required 
to be appointed during that Congress, if that appointment has not already been made. If 
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would rotate off the active bench after eighteen years and become 
Senior Justices.10 Senior Justices would “sit on the Court when 
needed to assure a full bench, participate in the Court’s authority to 
adopt procedural rules, and perform other judicial duties in their re-
spective circuits or as otherwise designated by the Chief Justice.”11 
Adoption of the SCRA arguably would not require a constitutional 
amendment because Justices would continue to enjoy lifetime ap-
pointments as required by Article III of the Constitution.12 Instead, 
Congress would enact the SCRA under its legislative authority to de-
fine what constitutes the “office” of Article III Judges, including Su-
preme Court Justices.13 
 The authors of the SCRA and others suggest that term limits for 
Supreme Court Justices are necessary because, inter alia, increased 
longevity and terms of service of the Justices, combined with the 
Court’s virtually absolute discretionary jurisdiction, have resulted in 
a decline in the productivity of the Court as measured by the number 
of cases accepted for review and the number of opinions issued per 
term.14 The purpose of this Article is to empirically test this claim. 
My prior expectation, formed on the basis of the life cycle hypothesis 
of human capital theory in economics,15 was that I would find support 
for this assertion in the data. On the whole, however, the findings of 
this Article do not provide clear support for this assertion. 
                                                                                                                     
more than one such vacancy arises, any additional appointment will be considered as the 
Justice required to be appointed during the next Congress for which no appointment has 
yet been made.” SCRA, supra note 1, § B. Under the other proposals, if a midterm vacancy 
occurs, an interim or replacement Justice would be appointed to serve the remainder of the 
term. See Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 2, at 52-53; DiTullio & Schochet, supra note 2, 
at 1119; Oliver, supra note 2, at 801. 
 10. See SCRA, supra note 1, §§ B-D. 
 11. Id. § B. Two of the other proposals cited supra note 2 would permit Justices to 
continue to perform judicial duties on inferior federal courts after the expiration of their 
respective eighteen-year terms on the Supreme Court. See Calabresi & Lindgren, supra 
note 2, at 51; DiTullio & Schochet, supra note 2, at 1120. 
 12. See SCRA, supra note 1, § E; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. But see Calabresi & 
Lindgren, supra note 2, at 20-21, 49, 78-89 (arguing generally that a constitutional 
amendment is required to impose term limits on Supreme Court Justices and specifically 
that the SCRA is unconstitutional). 
 13. See SCRA, supra note 1, § E. 
 14. See id. § A; Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, Reforming the Supreme 
Court: An Introduction, in REFORMING THE COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT 
JUSTICES 3, 4 (Roger C. Cramton & Paul D. Carrington eds., 2006); Meyers, supra note 3; 
Taylor, supra note 3; NPR, supra note 5. A closely related argument is that increased lon-
gevity and terms of service of the Justices have resulted in a rise in “mental decrepitude” 
on the Court. Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 2, at 17, 41-44; Daniel J. Meador, Thinking 
about Age and Supreme Court Tenure, in REFORMING THE COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR 
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 115, 117-18 (Roger C. Cramton & Paul D. Carrington eds., 
2006); Taylor, supra note 3; see also David J. Garrow, Mental Decrepitude on the U.S. Su-
preme Court: The Historical Case for a 28th Amendment, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 995 (2000) 
(providing a comprehensive history of mental decrepitude and incapacity on the Supreme 
Court). 
 15. See discussion infra Part II. 
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 The remainder of the Article is organized as follows. Part II pro-
vides selected background information about the Court and briefly 
discusses the life cycle hypothesis and related literature. Part III 
specifies the models and describes the data. Part IV presents the re-
sults of the empirical analysis. Part V concludes the Article with a 
summary of the empirical results and a brief discussion of the impli-
cations for the SCRA and other term limit proposals. 
II.   BACKGROUND AND RELATED LITERATURE 
 The U.S. Supreme Court is comprised of the Chief Justice and 
eight Associate Justices.16 The power to nominate the Justices is 
vested in the President, and appointments are made with the advice 
and consent of the Senate.17 Under Article III of the Constitution, 
Supreme Court Justices have life tenure.18 
 Since the Judiciary Act of 1925 (also known as the Certiorari Act 
or the “Judges’ Act”),19 which greatly reduced the Court’s mandatory 
jurisdiction and expanded its certiorari jurisdiction, the Supreme 
Court’s jurisdiction has been almost entirely discretionary.20 As a re-
sult of further acts of Congress, most notably in 197621 and 1988,22 
today the Court’s jurisdiction is virtually absolutely discretionary.23 
                                                                                                                     
 16. See 28 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). 
 17. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 18. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 19. Act of Feb. 23, 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 28 U.S.C.). 
 20. See, e.g., Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, The Discuss List: Agenda Build-
ing in the Supreme Court, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 807, 809 (1990) (stating that before 1925 
the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction was “almost entirely ‘obligatory’ ” but that after the Judi-
ciary Act of 1925 it was “almost entirely ‘discretionary’ in nature”); Arthur D. Hellman, 
The Business of the Supreme Court Under the Judiciary Act of 1925: The Plenary Docket 
in the 1970’s, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1711, 1712 (1978) (stating that “[t]he [Judiciary] Act of 
1925 . . . provided relief by giving the Court almost complete discretion to select the cases 
that it would decide”). 
 21. In 1976, Congress eliminated the requirement for three-judge courts in most con-
stitutional cases. See Act of Aug. 12, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-381, 90 Stat. 1119 (repealing 28 
U.S.C. §§ 2281-2282). “[T]he effect was also to relieve the Supreme Court of the most bur-
densome class of cases theretofore falling within the obligatory jurisdiction.” Hellman, su-
pra note 20, at 1712 n.10. 
 22. In 1988, Congress virtually eliminated the Court’s mandatory jurisdiction. See Act 
of June 27, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-352, 102 Stat. 662 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 28 U.S.C.); see also Bennett Boskey & Eugene Gressman, The Supreme Court Bids 
Farewell to Mandatory Appeals, 121 F.R.D. 81, 81 (1988) (“The 1988 legislation completes 
an historic transformation of the Court’s jurisdiction from a mandatory to a discretionary 
base.”). 
 23. For an overview of the statutory development of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction, 
see RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 466-69, 1552-56 (5th ed. 2003). For a more detailed account of the devel-
opment of the Court’s jurisdiction, including by acts of Congress and actions of the Court 
itself, see Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years 
After the Judges’ Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 1649-1713 (2000). 
2006]                         ARE TERM LIMITS NECESSARY? 165 
 
Accordingly, the Court controls its own workload.24 From 1875 to 
1925, the Court typically decided more than 200 cases per term.25 
From 1926 to 2001, the Court granted review to 160 new cases and 
issued 120 signed opinions per term on average. For the periods 
1977-2001 and 1989-2001, the Court averaged 147 and 102 new 
cases, respectively, and 113 and 90 signed opinions, respectively, per 
term. More recently (1998-2001), the Court has averaged fewer than 
94 new cases and 80 signed opinions per term. 
 Figure 1 displays the number of new cases and signed opinions 
per term from 1926 to 2001.26 The trends displayed in Figure 1, and 
in particular the sharp decline in the number of signed opinions dur-
ing the era of the Rehnquist Court, have received considerable atten-
tion from the press27 and legal commentators.28 While observers of 
the Court and even the Justices themselves have offered a number of 
possible explanations for these trends, there are a limited number of 
scholarly articles that examine the underlying causes in a systematic 
fashion.29 According to these studies, the leading cause of the recent 
decline in the Court’s plenary docket is changes in the members of 
                                                                                                                     
 24. See Carrington & Cramton, supra note 14, at 4 (“[U]nlike their predecessors prior 
to 1925, the Court now has virtually total control over its workload.”); Margaret Meri-
wether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Philosophy of Certiorari: Jurisprudential Consid-
erations in Supreme Court Case Selection, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 389, 389 (2004) (“Over the past 
century, the Supreme Court has gained virtually complete control over its own agenda. 
Once a relatively passive institution which heard all appeals that Congress authorized, the 
Court is now a virtually autonomous decisionmaker with respect to the nature and extent 
of its own workload.”). 
 25. See LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS, 
AND DEVELOPMENTS 54 (3d ed. 2003). The term of the Court begins on the first Monday in 
October and ends on the first Monday in October of the next year. See id. at 27. 
 26. The information on the number of new cases and signed opinions during the pe-
riod 1926 to 2001 in Figure 1, in the immediately preceding paragraph, and elsewhere in 
this Article is based on a data set constructed from EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 25, tbls. 2-3, 
2-4, 2-5, 2-6, and 2-8. The data set is available upon request. 
 27. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, The Shrinking Docket: Attorneys Try to Make an Issue 
Out of the Dramatic Decline in High Court Rulings, WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 1996, at A15; 
Linda Greenhouse, Case of the Shrinking Docket: Justices Spurn New Appeals, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 28, 1989, at A1. 
 28. See, e.g., David G. Savage, Docket Reflects Ideological Shifts: Shrinking Caseload, 
Cert Denials Suggest an Unfolding Agenda, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1995, at 40; David O. Stewart, 
Quiet Times: The Supreme Court is Reducing its Workload–But Why?, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1994, 
at 40. See also sources cited infra note 29. 
 29. See, e.g., Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Supreme Court’s 
Plenary Docket, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 737 (2001) (examining causes of the decline in the 
Court’s plenary docket beginning in 1989) [hereinafter Cordray & Cordray, Plenary 
Docket]; Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court, 1996 SUP. CT. 
REV. 403 [hereinafter Hellman, Shrunken Docket] (same); Arthur D. Hellman, The Su-
preme Court, the National Law, and the Selection of Cases for the Plenary Docket, 44 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 521 (1983) (examining the composition of the Court’s plenary docket from 
1977 through 1979); David M. O’Brien, Join-3 Votes, the Rule of Four, the Cert. Pool, and 
the Supreme Court’s Shrinking Plenary Docket, 13 J.L. & POL. 779 (1997) (examining 
causes of the decline in the Court’s plenary docket beginning with the Burger Court). 
166  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:161 
 
the Court.30 None of the studies, however, specifically consider the re-
lationship between the Court’s productivity and the age and tenure 
of the Justices. 
FIGURE 1 
NUMBER OF NEW CASES AND SIGNED OPINIONS PER TERM 
 The life cycle hypothesis of human capital theory posits an inverse 
U-shaped relationship between productivity and age.31 The hypothe-
sis predicts that productivity increases with age early in the life cycle 
as individuals accumulate human capital through investment in 
schooling and on-the-job training (that is, experience) and then de-
creases with age late in the life cycle as human capital depreciation 
exceeds investment.32 
 There is a vast empirical literature examining the life cycle hy-
pothesis. Several studies investigate the general age-productivity re-
lationship in the United States using cross-sectional data33 or longi-
                                                                                                                     
 30. See Cordray & Cordray, Plenary Docket, supra note 29, at 744-45 & nn.41-43, 793-
94; Hellman, Shrunken Docket, supra note 29, at 429-32; O’Brien, supra note 29, at 789, 
803-07. 
 31. See A. M. Diamond, Jr., An Economic Model of the Life-Cycle Research Productiv-
ity of Scientists, 6 SCIENTOMETRICS 189, 190-93 (1984); Richard W. Johnson & David Neu-
mark, Wage Declines Among Older Men, 78 REV. ECON. & STAT. 740, 740 (1996); see also 
GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS, WITH 
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO EDUCATION chs. 2-3 (2d ed. 1975); JACOB MINCER, SCHOOLING, 
EXPERIENCE, AND EARNINGS ch. 1 (1974). 
 32. Johnson & Neumark, supra note 31, at 740; see Diamond, supra note 31, at 
190-93. 
 33. See, e.g., Mary Jablonski et al., Productivity, Age, and Labor Composition Changes 
in the U.S., MONTHLY LAB. REV., Sept. 1988, at 34. 
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tudinal data.34 Other studies look at the impact of the age distribu-
tion on economic growth in Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) member countries35 and elsewhere. A 
number of studies specifically examine the relationship between pro-
ductivity and age in academic occupations. These studies generally 
use citations as the productivity measure, and the majority find that 
productivity declines with age.36 However, at least two studies argue 
that productivity is constant with age.37 
 A handful of studies investigate the relationship between judicial 
productivity and age.38 Using quality (that is, citations) and quantity 
measures, Richard A. Posner finds that the productivity of judges of 
the U.S. Courts of Appeals declines with age but that this decline 
does not set in until an unusually advanced age (at least over eighty 
years of age).39 Montgomery N. Kosma, using data on U.S. Supreme 
Court Justices, finds that older appointees exert more influence (as 
                                                                                                                     
 34. See, e.g., John C. Haltiwanger et al., Productivity Differences Across Employers: 
The Roles of Employer Size, Age, and Human Capital, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 94 (May 1999); 
Johnson & Neumark, supra note 31. 
 35. E.g., Björn Andersson, Scandinavian Evidence on Growth and Age Structure, 35 
REGIONAL STUD. 377 (2001); Thomas Lindh & Bo Malmberg, Age Structure Effects and 
Growth in the OECD, 1950-1990, 12 J. POPULATION ECON. 431 (1999). 
 36. See, e.g., HARVEY C. LEHMAN, AGE AND ACHIEVEMENT (1953); Arthur M. Diamond, 
Jr., The Life-Cycle Research Productivity of Mathematicians and Scientists, 41 J. 
GERONTOLOGY 520 (1986); Thomas H. Goodwin & Raymond D. Sauer, Life Cycle Productiv-
ity in Academic Research: Evidence from Cumulative Publication Histories of Academic 
Economists, 61 S. ECON. J. 728 (1995); Sharon G. Levin & Paula E. Stephan, Research 
Productivity Over the Life Cycle: Evidence for Academic Scientists, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 114 
(1991); John M. McDowell, Obsolescence of Knowledge and Career Publication Profiles: 
Some Evidence of Differences Among Fields in Costs of Interrupted Careers, 72 AM. ECON. 
REV. 752 (1982); Sharon M. Oster & Daniel S. Hamermesh, Aging and Productivity Among 
Economists, 80 REV. ECON. & STAT. 154 (1998); Robert M. Soldofsky, Age and Productivity 
of University Faculties: A Case Study, 3 ECON. EDUC. REV. 289 (1984). 
 37. See Stephen Cole, Age and Scientific Performance, 84 AM. J. SOC. 958 (1979); 
Nancy Stern, Age and Achievement in Mathematics: A Case Study in the Sociology of Sci-
ence, 8 SOC. STUD. SCI. 127 (1978). 
 38. See RICHARD A. POSNER, AGING AND OLD AGE ch. 8 (1995); Mita Bhattacharya & 
Russell Smyth, Aging and Productivity Among Judges: Some Empirical Evidence from the 
High Court of Australia, 40 AUSTL. ECON. PAPERS 199 (2001) [hereinafter Bhattacharya & 
Smyth, Aging and Productivity]; Mita Bhattacharya & Russell Smyth, The Determinants of 
Judicial  Prestige and Influence: Some Empirical Evidence from the High Court of Austra-
lia, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 223 (2001) [hereinafter Bhattacharya & Smyth, Determinants]; 
Montgomery N. Kosma, Measuring the Influence of Supreme Court Judges, 27 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 333 (1998); Russell Smyth & Mita Bhattacharya, How Fast Do Old Judges Slow 
Down? A Life Cycle Study of the Aging and Productivity in the Federal Court of Australia, 
23 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 141 (2003). There are several additional studies of judicial pro-
ductivity (as measured by citations) that do not focus on the role of age. See, e.g., David 
Klein & Darby Morrisroe, The Prestige and Influence of Individual Judges on the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 371 (1999); William M. Landes et al., Judicial Influ-
ence: A Citation Analysis of Federal Courts of Appeals Judges, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 271 
(1998); Peter McCormick, The Supreme Court Cites the Supreme Court: Follow-up Citation 
on the Supreme Court of Canada, 1989-1993, 33 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 453 (1996). 
 39. See POSNER, supra note 38, at 180-92. 
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measured by adjusted citations) than younger appointees, while Mita 
Bhattacharya and Russell Smyth, using data on High Court of Aus-
tralia Justices, find that younger appointees exhibit greater influence 
by the same measure.40 Bhattacharya and Smyth also explicitly 
study judicial productivity in a life cycle framework. Using adjusted 
citations as the productivity measure, they find support for the life 
cycle hypothesis among judges in Australia.41 
III.   SPECIFICATIONS AND DATA 
 This Article examines two measures of the productivity of the U.S. 
Supreme Court. The first productivity measure is the number of 
cases granted review per term by the Court under its mandatory and 
discretionary jurisdiction.42 The second productivity measure is the 
number of signed opinions issued per term by the Court.43 It is im-
portant to acknowledge that these may not be the best measures of 
the Court’s productivity. Among their deficiencies is that they are not 
quality adjusted measures; they are gross quantities which fail to 
take into account the importance or difficulty of the cases or the qual-
ity of the opinions. I examine them because they are the productivity 
measures suggested by the authors of the SCRA and others.44 In de-
fense of these measures, one could argue that, a priori, there is no 
reason to believe that the importance or difficulty of the cases before 
the Court or the quality of the opinions issued by the Court has var-
ied systematically with time. Moreover, one could argue that any pro-
posed methods for ranking cases by importance or difficulty and 
opinions by quality would be fatally subjective.45 Therefore, while I 
                                                                                                                     
 40. Kosma, supra note 38, at 367-69; Bhattacharya & Smyth, Determinants, supra 
note 38, at 244-48. 
 41. Bhattacharya & Smyth, Aging and Productivity, supra note 38, at 207, 210; 
Smyth & Bhattacharya, supra note 38, at 154-63. 
 42. Specifically, the CASES measure includes the number of original jurisdiction 
cases plus the number of petitions for certiorari (including paid cases and in forma pau-
peris cases) granted review per term. See infra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 43. Note that the number of signed opinions does not include per curiam opinions is-
sued after oral argument. Since 1940, the Court has issued fewer than 27 and averaged 
fewer than 13 such per curiam opinions per term. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 25, tbl. 2-
8. Their inclusion would not materially alter the results presented in this Article. 
 44. See supra note 14; cf. Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Choosing the Next Su-
preme Court Justice: An Empirical Ranking of Judge Performance, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 23 
(2004) (using the number of published opinions as a measure of judicial productivity in 
connection with a “tournament” of federal appeals courts judges). 
 45. But see, e.g., Smyth & Bhattacharya, supra note 38, at 146-49 (arguing that cita-
tions are an acceptable proxy for the quality of judicial opinions and that quality can be 
used to measure productivity). 
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acknowledge their limitations, it seems reasonable to consider these 
measures, at least in the first instance.46 
 For each productivity measure, I specify two models. In the first 
model, the explanatory variables of primary interest are the mean 
age and mean tenure of the Justices at the start of the term. In the 
second model, the key explanatory variables are the percentage of 
Justices less than 61 years old and the percentage more than 68 
years old at the start of the term and the percentage of Justices with 
fewer than 8 years of service and the percentage with more than 13 
years of service at the start of the term. I use these cutoffs because 
they each reflect one standard deviation from their respective 
means.47 In addition, I include as control variables in each model the 
annual budget appropriation to the Court and dummy variables indi-
cating the Chief Justice. I include the budget variable to control for 
changes in the Court’s fiscal resources and the Chief Justice dummy 
variables to allow for structural changes. In models in which the 
number of opinions is the productivity measure, I include as addi-
tional control variables the percentage of cases containing at least 
one dissenting opinion and the percentage of cases decided by a one-
vote margin. These variables are meant to serve as rough proxies for 
the level difficulty of the cases decided by the Court in each term. 
 Specifically, I estimate the following four models: 
(1)    CASESt  = 1  +  2AGEt  +  3(AGEt)2  +  4TENUREt  +  5(TENUREt)2  +  
  6BUDGETt  +  Dt  +  t 
(2)    OPINIONSt   = 1  +  2AGEt  +  3(AGEt)2  +  4TENUREt  +5(TENUREt)2  + 
   6BUDGETt  +  7DISSENTt  +  81VOTEt  +  Dt  +  t 
(3)    CASESt  = 1  +  2%<61t  +  3%>68t  +  4%<8t  +  5%>13t  +  
   6BUDGETt  +  Dt  +  t 
(4)    OPINIONSt  = 1  +  2%<61t  +  3%>68t  +  4%<8t  +  5%>13t  +  6BUDGETt + 
   7DISSENTt  +  81VOTEt  +  Dt  +  t 
where Dt = 1TAFTt + 2STONEt + 3VINSONt + 4WARRENt + 
5BURGERt + 6REHNQUISTt. 
                                                                                                                     
 46. For a recent collection of articles and essays that examine the topic of empirical 
measures of judicial performance, see Symposium, Empirical Measures of Judicial Per-
formance, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1001 (2005). 
 47. The mean age and tenure of the Justices in my sample is 64.4 and 10.7 years, 
respectively, and the standard deviations are 3.7 and 2.7 years, respectively. See infra 
Table 2. 
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 To estimate these four models, I constructed a data set that spans 
from 1926 to 2001, covering 76 terms of the Court. The principal 
source for my data set is the 2003 Supreme Court Compendium,48 
which collects Supreme Court data from a variety of primary and 
secondary sources. I also consulted a constitutional law textbook49 for 
the lines of succession of the Justices and used the Consumer Price 
Index50 to adjust the budget data for inflation. 
 Table 1 sets forth definitions for each of the variables in the four 
models. In addition, each model contains dummy variables for the 
Chief Justice. The Hughes Court is the benchmark category. During 
Chief Justice Hughes’ tenure (1930-40), the Court averaged 159 new 
cases and 153 signed opinions per term.51 Table 2 sets forth descrip-
tive statistics for each of the variables other than the Chief Justice 
dummy variables. Note that AGE and TENURE are in months; 
BUDGET is in thousands of 1982-84 U.S. dollars; and %<61, %>68, 
%<8, %>13, DISSENT, and 1 VOTE are percentages. Figures 2 
through 5 display the trends in AGE, TENURE, BUDGET, 
DISSENT, and 1 VOTE over the sample period (1926-2001). 
                                                                                                                     
 48. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 25. 
 49. WALTER F. MURPHY ET AL., AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION app. B 
(1st ed. 1986). 
 50. Specifically, I used the All Urban Consumers (CPI-U), U.S. City Average, All 
Items, 1982-84=100 index. BUREAU OF LABOR STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, CONSUMER PRICE 
INDEX: ALL URBAN CONSUMERS (1982-84), available at ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/ 
cpi/cpiai.txt. 
 51. See supra note 26. 
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TABLE 1 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
VARIABLE DEFINITION 
CASES 
Number of original jurisdiction cases plus the number of petitions for cer-
tiorari (including paid cases and in forma pauperis cases) granted review 
per term52 
OPINIONS Number of signed opinions issued per term53 
AGE Mean age of the Justices at the start of the term (in months) 
TENURE Mean tenure of the Justices at the start of the term (in months) 
BUDGET Budget appropriation to the Court for the fiscal year at the start of the term(in thousands of 1982-84 U.S. dollars)54 
%<61 Percentage of Justices less than 61 years old at the start of the term  
%>68 Percentage of Justices more than 68 years old at the start of the term  
%<8 Percentage of Justices with fewer than 8 years of service at the start of the term 
%>13 Percentage of Justices with more than 13 years of service at the start of the term 
DISSENT Percentage of cases with at least one dissenting opinion per term55 
1 VOTE Percentage of cases decided by a one-vote margin per term56 
 
                                                                                                                     
 52. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 25, tbls. 2-3, 2-4, 2-5, and 2-6. For 1926 to 1935, 
CASES includes only the number of petitions for certiorari granted review. For 1970 to 
2001, the number of original jurisdiction cases is calculated as the number of filed cases on 
the original docket for the term minus the number of filed cases on the original docket for 
the prior term plus the number of disposed cases from the original docket for the prior 
term. 
 53. See id. tbl. 2-8. Note that the number of signed opinions does not include per cu-
riam opinions issued after oral argument. See supra note 43. 
 54. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 25, tbl. 1-9. For 1926 to 1929, BUDGET is assigned 
a value of $2 million. For 1975 and 1976, BUDGET is adjusted to account for a change in 
the federal government’s fiscal year end. 
 55. See id. tbl. 3-2. Due to ambiguity in the description of data prior to 1953, it is un-
clear whether such data represent the number of dissenting opinions or the number of 
cases with dissenting opinions. 
 56. See id. tbl. 3-4. 1 VOTE includes only cases decided by a 5-4 or 4-3 vote. 
172  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:161 
 
TABLE 2 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Median Maximum 
CASES 76 160.4 53.8 82.0 153.0 304.0 
OPINIONS 76 120.1 29.4 65.0 124.5 199.0 
AGE 76 772.4 44.3 683.9 769.0 858.1 
TENURE 76 128.0 32.4 50.7 128.0 194.7 
BUDGET 76 10,256 6,898 2,000 7,635 28,797 
%<61 76 36.4 18.7 0 33.3 77.8 
%>68 76 35.1 18.7 0 33.3 66.7 
%<8 76 42.7 16.7 11.1 44.4 77.8 
%>13 76 32.6 15.2 0 33.3 77.8 
DISSENT 76 50.9 20.6 7.1 57.6 86.5 
1 VOTE 76 13.3 8.1 0 13.3 30.4 
FIGURE 2 
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FIGURE 3 
MEAN TENURE (IN YEARS) 
FIGURE 4 
BUDGET (IN THOUSANDS OF 1982-84 U.S. DOLLARS) 
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FIGURE 5 
DISSENTS AND ONE-VOTE MARGINS 
 
IV.   RESULTS 
 This Part reports ordinary least squares (OLS) and feasible gen-
eralized least squares (FGLS) estimates for models 1 through 4. For 
each model, the Durbin-Watson and Breusch-Godfrey tests suggest 
positive first-order serial correlation of the OLS residuals. Therefore, 
I focus on the FGLS estimates for each model, which are obtained by 
generalized differencing.57 
A.   Model 1: CASES 
 Table 3 reports the results for model 1. The coefficients on AGE 
and AGESQ have the expected signs and are significant at the 10% 
level. They suggest an inverse U-shaped relationship between 
CASES and AGE, consistent with the life cycle hypothesis. In par-
ticular, they suggest CASES reaches its maximum when AGE is 40.6 
years and decreases throughout the relevant AGE range. (The sam-
ple values of AGE range from 57 to 71.5 years.) Figure 6 displays the 
predicted values of CASES over the relevant AGE range.58 The only 
other significant coefficients in model 1 are the coefficients on 
VINSON and BURGER. They suggest that, ceteris paribus, the Vin-
                                                                                                                     
 57. For purposes of generalized differencing, I estimate the autocorrelation coefficient 
using the Durbin-Watson statistic. For each model, this estimate is substantially similar to 
the Theil-Nagar estimate and to the estimate given by a first-order autoregression of 
the OLS residuals. In addition, I employ the Prais-Winsten transformation of the first 
observation. 
 58. In Figures 6, 7, and 8, predicted values are calculated holding all other variables 
constant at their sample means. 
0. 00  
0.10 
  
0.20 
  
0.30 
  
0.40 
  
0.50 
  
0.60 
  
0.70  
0. 80 
  
1925  1930  1935  1940  1945 1950  1955  1960  1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Term  
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
of
 C
as
es
   
Taft   Hughes   Stone     
Dissent   
1 Vote 
  
0.90 
  
1.00 
  RehnquistBurgerWarren Vinson 
2006]                         ARE TERM LIMITS NECESSARY? 175 
 
son Court was less productive than benchmark while the Burger 
Court was more productive than benchmark, as measured by the 
number of new cases granted review per term. 
TABLE 3 
MODEL 1: CASES 
OLS FGLS 
VARIABLE 
COEFFICIENT STD. ERROR COEFFICIENT STD. ERROR 
CONSTANT -530 2030 21.1 191.0 
AGE 2.660 5.303 0.9774* 0.5578 
AGESQ -0.002175 0.003371 -0.0010034* 0.0005116 
TENURE -0.896 1.429 -0.142 1.271 
TENURESQ 0.005598 0.005006 0.001997 0.004603 
BUDGET -0.002291 0.001815 -0.001448 0.002096 
TAFT -46.62** 20.94 -41.84 26.84 
STONE -56.70* 34.03 -43.92 34.98 
VINSON -90.00*** 27.04 -74.38** 30.71 
WARREN -42.08* 25.28 -32.31 28.48 
BURGER 63.25** 27.74 59.37* 32.06 
REHNQUIST -58.65 37.64 -54.08 43.20 
R2 0.668  0.948  
Adjusted R2 0.610  0.939  
F 11.69***  96.66***  
Durbin-Watson 1.525  1.812  
* significant at 10% level  
** significant at 5% level  
*** significant at 1% level 
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FIGURE 6 
CASES (PREDICTED) AND AGE 
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B.   Model 2: OPINIONS 
 Table 4 reports the results for model 2. The coefficients on AGE 
and AGESQ have the expected signs and are significant at the 1% 
level. They suggest an inverse U-shaped relationship between 
OPINIONS and AGE, consistent with the life cycle hypothesis. How-
ever, the predicted value of OPINIONS increases through the rele-
vant AGE range, reaching its maximum when AGE is 73.2 years, 
which is greater than the maximum sample value. This result is con-
sistent with Posner’s finding that the age-related decline in the pro-
ductivity of judges does not set in until an unusually advanced age.59 
Figure 7 displays the predicted values of OPINIONS over the rele-
vant AGE range. 
 The coefficients on TENURE and TENURESQ, which are signifi-
cant at the 5% level, suggest a U-shaped relationship between 
OPINIONS and TENURE that reaches its minimum when TENURE 
is 11.8 years. (The sample values of TENURE range from 4.2 to 16.2 
years.) However, the predicted value of OPINIONS is relatively con-
stant when TENURE is between 10 and 13 years, and TENURE is 
greater than or equal to 10 years for 62% of the sample. Hence, the 
predicted value of OPINIONS is constant or increasing with 
TENURE, as expected, over the majority of the relevant TENURE 
range. Figure 8 displays the predicted values of OPINIONS over the 
relevant TENURE range. 
                                                                                                                     
 59. See POSNER, supra note 38, at 180-92. 
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 The coefficient on BUDGET is significant at the 5% level but, un-
expectedly, is negative. However, it arguably is practically insignifi-
cant, for it suggests the number of opinions issued per term de-
creases only by 2 for every 1 million 1982-84 U.S. dollars increase in 
the Court’s budget, which averaged 10 million 1982-84 U.S. dollars 
over the sample period. The coefficients on VINSON and WARREN 
are significant at the 1% level and suggest that, ceteris paribus, the 
Vinson and Warren Courts were less productive than benchmark, as 
measured by the number of signed opinions issued per term. No 
other coefficients are significant at or below the 10% level. 
TABLE 4 
MODEL 2: OPINIONS 
OLS FGLS 
VARIABLE 
COEFFICIENT STD. ERROR COEFFICIENT STD. ERROR 
CONSTANT 363 1071 -205.92*** 72.41 
AGE -0.302 2.793 1.0860*** 0.2362 
AGESQ 0.000280 0.001785 -0.0006181*** 0.0002252 
TENURE -2.19112*** 0.7200 -1.6300** 0.6525 
TENURESQ 0.007825*** 0.002487 0.005746** 0.002309 
BUDGET -0.0025589*** 0.0009052 -0.002109** 0.001001 
DISSENT 0.4053 0.3662 0.2170 0.3067 
1 VOTE 0.3758 0.4176 0.5187 0.3454 
TAFT 1.36 10.20 -20.57 12.82 
STONE -43.00* 22.50 -31.81 19.87 
VINSON -79.23*** 24.73 -61.13*** 22.67 
WARREN -59.03*** 18.08 -56.60*** 17.42 
BURGER -12.99 20.28 -15.59 19.46 
REHNQUIST -33.35 22.13 -35.88 22.71 
R2 0.745  0.978  
Adjusted R2 0.691  0.973  
F 13.90***  191.75***  
Durbin-Watson 1.397  1.842  
* significant at 10% level  
** significant at 5% level 
*** significant at 1% level 
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FIGURE 7 
OPINIONS (PREDICTED) AND AGE 
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C.   Model 3: CASES and Model 4: OPINIONS 
 Tables 5 and 6 report the results for models 3 and 4, respectively. 
In both models, the coefficients on %<61 and %>13 have the expected 
signs (positive); in model 4, they are significant at the 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. However, the coefficients on %>68 and %<8 also 
are positive in both models and in model 4 are significant at the 1% 
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level.60 These results are contrary to my expectations, for they sug-
gest that the Court’s productivity increases with the percentage of 
elderly and less experienced Justices, respectively. 
 In model 4, the coefficients on TAFT, WARREN, and 
REHNQUIST are significant at the 10%, 1%, and 5% levels, respec-
tively, and suggest that, ceteris paribus, the Taft Court was more 
productive than benchmark while the Warren and Rehnquist Courts 
were less productive than benchmark, as measured by the number of 
signed opinions issued per term. In addition, the coefficient on 
1 VOTE is significant but unexpectedly positive, suggesting that the 
number of signed opinions increases (¾-to-1) with the percentage of 
cases decided by a one-vote margin per term. 
TABLE 5  
MODEL 3: CASES 
OLS FGLS 
VARIABLE 
COEFFICIENT STD. ERROR COEFFICIENT STD. ERROR 
CONSTANT 88.08* 45.80 69.93 48.20 
%<61 0.5484 0.4470 0.6083 0.4791 
%>68 -0.0082 0.4355 0.2450 0.4835 
%<8 0.8647* 0.4709 0.9661* 0.5022 
%>13 0.6395 0.5816 0.5016 0.6020 
BUDGET 0.000808 0.002099 0.001507 0.002341 
TAFT -48.25** 21.74 -33.35 24.54 
STONE -38.34 26.19 -37.58 28.81 
VINSON -46.12* 26.02 -36.24 30.12 
WARREN -16.02 21.60 -11.12 24.95 
BURGER 60.87** 29.43 50.99 33.49 
REHNQUIST -68.13 42.35 -69.04 46.24 
R2 0.669  0.939  
Adjusted R2 0.612  0.928  
F 11.76***  81.01***  
Durbin-Watson 1.359  1.822  
* significant at 10% level  
** significant at 5% level  
*** significant at 1% level 
                                                                                                                     
 60. Also, the coefficient on %<8 is significant at the 10% level in model 3. It is the only 
individually significant coefficient at or below the 10% level in model 3. 
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TABLE 6 
 MODEL 4: OPINIONS 
OLS FGLS 
VARIABLE 
COEFFICIENT STD. ERROR COEFFICIENT STD. ERROR 
CONSTANT 93.04*** 22.51 51.63** 24.66 
%<61 0.5370** 0.2192 0.5280** 0.2475 
%>68 0.4577** 0.2136 0.6991*** 0.2501 
%<8 0.1742 0.2304 0.6867*** 0.2571 
%>13 0.5644* 0.2899 0.5980* 0.3109 
BUDGET -0.001018 0.001052 0.000467 0.001231 
DISSENT -0.1823 0.3135 -0.1365 0.3058 
1 VOTE 0.8010** 0.3714 0.7734** 0.3561 
TAFT 19.05* 10.65 24.30* 12.86 
STONE -11.90 16.44 -23.47 17.93 
VINSON -26.00 22.61 -17.73 23.78 
WARREN -52.76*** 17.41 -52.83*** 18.27 
BURGER -9.15 20.31 -25.12 22.01 
REHNQUIST -47.48* 23.92 -64.23** 26.56 
R2 0.743  0.967  
Adjusted R2 0.689  0.960  
F 13.79***  129.22***  
Durbin-Watson 1.261  1.537  
* significant at 10% level  
** significant at 5% level 
*** significant at 1% level 
V.   SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 The empirical findings of this Article may be summarized as fol-
lows. In general, the results of models 1 and 2 are consistent with the 
life cycle hypothesis of human capital theory and the related empiri-
cal literature. However, the results of model 2 suggest that the 
Court’s productivity is increasing over the relevant age range and 
does not decline until the mean age of Court is beyond its maximum 
mean age since at least 1926, which is consistent with Posner’s find-
ing that the age-related decline in the productivity of judges does not 
set in until an unusually advanced age.61 The results of model 2 fur-
ther suggest that the productivity of the Court increases with the 
                                                                                                                     
 61. See POSNER, supra note 38, at 180-92. 
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mean tenure of the Justices over the majority of the relevant tenure 
range. Finally, the results of models 3 and 4 suggest that the produc-
tivity of the Court increases with the percentage of Justices over 68 
years of age and with fewer than 8 years of service. 
 On the whole, the results of this Article do not provide clear sup-
port for the assertion that increased longevity and terms of service of 
the Justices have resulted in a decline in the productivity of the 
Court as measured by the number of cases accepted for review and 
the number of opinions issued per term. Accordingly, this Article 
cautions against relying too heavily on this claim to support the 
SCRA and other recent proposals to impose term limits for Supreme 
Court Justices. It is important to note, however, that this Article 
does not address the other reasons offered by proponents of term lim-
its, including the increased politicization of the confirmation process, 
which may or may not be valid.62 Therefore, this Article does not nec-
essarily counsel against term limits. It simply casts doubt on one of 
several stated rationales for terms limits. 
 An interesting tangential result of this Article is that the Chief 
Justice appears to matter. In each model, two or more of the coeffi-
cients on the Chief Justice dummy variables are statistically and 
practically significant, which suggests the Chief Justice has a ceteris 
paribus influence on the productivity of the Court. This finding is 
consistent with the branch of the literature (reviewed in Part II) that 
suggests the leading cause of the recent decline in the Court’s ple-
nary docket is changes in the members of the Court63 and with a 
branch of the literature (not reviewed in Part II) that finds the Chief 
Justice (or his foreign counterpart) is a major determining factor of 
the level of consensus on the Court (or its foreign counterpart).64 
                                                                                                                     
 62. See SCRA, supra note 1, § A; Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 2, at 39-41 (arguing that, 
in addition to a rise in “mental decreptitude” on the Court, the reasons to reconsider life tenure for 
Supreme Court Justices include democratic unaccountability, increased politicization of the con-
firmation process, and Presidential incentive to nominate younger, less experienced candidates); 
DiTullio & Schochet, supra note 2, at 1101-19 (arguing that the problems created by life tenure in-
clude strategic retirements by Justices, incentives for young nominees, and random distribution of 
appointments); Oliver, supra note 2, at 802-12 (arguing that the political benefits of term limits in-
clude reducing the President’s incentive to appoint very young candidates, reducing a Justice’s in-
centive to time his or her retirement in an effort to influence the future ideological composition of 
the Court, and balancing the influence of Presidents on the Court). 
 63. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text. 
 64. See, e.g., David J. Danelski, The Influence of the Chief Justice in the Decisional Process of 
the Supreme Court, in AMERICAN COURT SYSTEMS 486 (Sheldon Goldman & Austin Sarat eds., 2d 
ed. 1989); ROBERT J. STEAMER, CHIEF JUSTICE: LEADERSHIP AND THE SUPREME COURT (1986); 
Gregory A. Caldeira & Christopher J. W. Zorn, On Time and Consensual Norms in the Supreme 
Court, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 874 (1998); Stacia L. Haynie, Leadership and Consensus on the U.S. Su-
preme Court, 54 J. POL. 1158 (1992); Russell Smyth & Paresh Kumar Narayan, Hail to the Chief! 
Leadership and Structural Change in the Level of Consensus on the High Court of Australia, 1 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 399 (2004); Thomas G. Walker et al., On the Mysterious Demise of Con-
sensual Norms in the United States Supreme Court, 50 J. POL. 361 (1988). 
